There’s always something to howl about.

Dual Agency Smack-Down: If being a big brokerage is an inherent agency violation, it’s not the client’s fault . . .

Please. Recognize that everything I say or write is true and do not argue with me. Thanks!

Hi! Welcome to BloodhoundBlog. My name is Greg Swann. I question everything. πŸ˜‰

From my point of view, we’re still not getting any traction.

But single agency is not a viable business model.  Period.  A viable business model is one that would allow for unfettered growth (as long as it was filling a need to the consumer) and single agency is not possible if a company grows.

Without intending to quibble, agency is not about the vendor, his business model or its potential for growth. Agency is about the interests of the client, which are paramount to all others. If a particular business model violates agency, then, as Russell argues very cogently with respect to Redfin.com, it is criminal in se in states where agency is a fiduciary obligation.

There are about 925 agents with John Hall & Associates.  It would be quite stupid to preclude them from showing a listing so the seller (and buyer) gets the “benefit” of single agency.

This is not an argument against dual agency. It is an argument for getting rid of the broker/salesperson licensing laws. If we did that, then every listing agent would be alike unto a self-employed broker now. Dual Agency would still be possible, but it would be much easier to manage, since it could only occur when the agent represented buyers to his own listings. Major brokerages like John Hall could easily transition to affiliations or companies, instead — same cost structure, but no liability. We would still have to police for other forms of collusion or shady dealing, but Dual Agency would be all but eliminated.

In any case, arguing that refraining from Dual Agency would be impractical is not a persuasively-valid reason to uphold or reject it. As before: Sub-Agency was much more practical than Buyer Brokerage, but we got rid of it anyway.

The idea that the agent somehow controls what a buyer will pay and what a seller will accept only indicates a disconnect from reality.

I think this is a very weak argument. I want to deal with it in detail in another post. For now: Either skill and expertise are worth something or they aren’t. If they aren’t, we have worse problems than Dual Agency. If I am forbidden by a Disclosed Dual Agency from exercising the very best of my skill and expertise, how is this not an agency violation essentially equal to the agency violations practiced by Redfin?

Both Russell and Jeff have complained that this is a dreary issue? Is it? So far, I haven’t heard one argument that I think is dispositive as a matter of policy. Todd Tarson’s argument has merit in certain fairly rare circumstances. Jeff Brown’s 1031 argument is plausible, but a contrary case is equally plausible. The other arguments — sellers like it, it’s practical, and it’s useful in big brokerages — seem to me to skirt the fundamental issue of agency itself: What is in the best interests of each client, considered separately, irrespective of any other interest?

I don’t think anyone here can argue that, ideally, the best circumstance for seller and buyer is to be represented by one brokerage in a Disclosed Dual Agency. Another way of saying the same thing: If you were an unlicensed buyer or seller, which would you prefer, a zealous advocate for your interests or a mute transaction facilitator?

Russell, Jeff, I hold you gentlemen in the highest esteem. But, so far, I don’t think you have offered any persuasively-valid reasons for an actual consumer to prefer Dual Agency to separate representation.

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